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Political Anthropology as a Theoretical Framework:  
G. Balandier, M. Mauss, F. Barth 
 
The term “political anthropology” was one of those sub-disciplinary categories produced 
by post-war “classical anthropology”, and accordingly inspired by the major postwar–isms: 
functionalism, structuralism and Marxism. The demise of these narratives led to the 
momentary retreat of “political anthropology” in the early 1980s. And yet, from exactly the 
same moment, anthropology experienced a return to politics via post-structuralism. The 
shift in the social and political sciences toward an understanding of power outside and 
beyond state and sovereignty, replaced by a focus on representation and symbolic power, 
prepared the way for what may even be recognized as an “anthropological turn” in 
politics.1 
 
Collaboration between anthropology and politics, particularly in the area of concepts and 
methodologies, is highly beneficial for both disciplines, though they also deal with some 
troubling aspects of the relationship. Through the basic methods of research that bridge 
both disciplines — ethnography and case study — and the use of “anthropological” 
concepts and sensibilities, a greater understanding of some of the most challenging political 
issues of the day can be achieved. 
  
In considering how anthropologists have chosen to look at and write about politics, Joan 
Vincent contends that the anthropological study of politics is itself a historical process.2 
Throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s the meanings of the “political” when talking 
about politics was wide enough to make it very difficult not to generalize with some of the 
many interfaces between anthropology and the social and political sciences.3 At the turn of 
the new century, a synthesis of sorts seems to have emerged, in which selected postmodern 
insights have been developed within a strongly empirical framework.4 For political 
anthropology, the reconceptualization of the nature of power by Michel Foucault and 
others (Edward Said) is requiring new modes of research and analysis.5 
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In so many ways, contemporary “politics of” anthropology is a marriage between critical theory 
approaches and postmodern, “Foucaldian” emphases on power and representation, held together by 
the bottom-up approaches that have always defined anthropology. Much “politics of” anthropology 
simultaneously draws on older (Leftist) vocabularies of repression as well as resistance and newer 
ones that stress strategies of representation, local agency and diversity.6 
 
The use of a political-anthropological theoretical framework for this research is particularly 
efficient as one of the main insights provided by political anthropologists was always that 
the “political” cannot be so neatly separated, as the political sphere intersects with social 
and cultural patterns and practices.7 This is especially relevant for those societies in which a 
great deal of “politics” takes places via informal networks and informal institutions, 
sometimes underpinning or overlapping with the more objectifiable ones that political 
scientists concentrate on.8 In general, these sorts of debates are mainly addressed to those 
societies lacking of a formal political institution or — as for the case of Lebanon — to 
those with a particularly weak and/or corrupted system.  
 
Georges Balandier claimed that the foundations of political anthropology laid back at the 
beginning of the 1920s.9 Bjørn Thomassen consolidates this claim referring to the work of 
Marcel Mauss who in the interwar period did in fact seek to establish new foundations for 
anthropology and sociology.10 
 
This framework will consider the works of George Balandier, specifically his theories on 
kinship and lineages to analyze and describe the historical clanic structure of Lebanese 
society. In reference to the rise, establishment, and decline of ‘asabiyya, Balnadier’s 
examination of Marxist theories according to which class-society and the state are a result 
of the dissolution of the primitive communities and the political emerges with the 
disappearance of personal blood ties will be considered. Likewise, Balandier’s investigation 
on lineage structure and power, territorial structure and political structure — as well as the 
“total political enterprise”, from the capitalization of wealth to the secession and 
genealogical legitimization — will constitute an important theoretical outline for a 
structured approach on the evolution of “family power” in Shiite Lebanon. 
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Far from conceiving of kinship and the political as mutually exclusive terms, political 
anthropology has revealed the complex ties that exist between the two systems and has 
analyzed and developed the theories of their relations on the basis of fieldwork.11 
Additional aspects of “segmentary power”, social stratification, and “feudality” and 
relations of dependence will possibly highlight some dimensions of traditional notables, 
patronage and kinship in South Lebanon, as well as H.M. Fried (1957; 196012) critical 
inventory on lineage groups (corporate groups) as opposed to descent groups. 
 
With a move away from the traditional forms of ‘asabiyya —and in the highlights of Vali 
Nasr’s analysis that suggests that the south of Lebanon (a Hezbollah stronghold) is doing 
well economically, not just because of Hezbollah’s redistribution of resources, but thanks 
to businessmen and a provincial Shiite middle class that is riding on their coattails — 
Marcel Mauss production constitutes the framework for a comparative analysis between 
economic and political systems and an investigation on the recent Shiite productive, 
“capitalist” bourgeoisie.  Even though the greatest majority of literature that traces a 
genealogical groundwork of political and economical Amal, Hezbollah and the 
dispossessed Shi‘a refers to the works of Che Guevara, Franz Fanon and Karl Marx, the 
shift proposed by Nasr requires a less structural and a more dynamic perspective. While 
Marcel Mauss is considered a classic, anthropologists have rarely considered the evident 
political dimensions of his work, let alone Mauss’ political engagement.13Yet Mauss The Gift 
was just that: a political theory. Marcel Mauss was indeed inspired by Socialism, as the first 
Shiite movements in Lebanon were. Nonetheless, The Gift certainly does not display a 
utopian-socialist theory that can be reduced to a formalistic model of exchange and 
communication. The essay on The Gift was indeed only a part of Mauss’ larger engagement 
with monetary capitalism,14 as demonstrated by his Écrits politiques (1997), and gift-giving 
principle was not a romantic counter-principle to capitalist market economy.15 Mauss wrote 
extensively on socialism, but never expressed the opinion that markets could or should be 
replaced with Socialist states.16 This specific segment of the theoretical framework helps to 
describe the economical evolution of the Lebanese Shi‘a as represented by the bourgeois 
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entrepreneurial “not-too-secular-not-too-religious” Amal, constantly ambivalent in 
representing itself as a mainstream party invested in the Lebanese nation, sidelining 
Hezbollah as a sectarian party and with its leader and Speaker of the Parliament, Nabih 
Berri, who has direct access to the State resources. What kind of “ethnic” entrepreneurship 
does Amal display? Is Amal’s avoidance of a too loud religious discourse today appealing to 
the even larger Shiite secularist community? Shiite ethnic entrepreneurs are the main actors 
of this investigation, sometimes transcending the national, the transnational (Iran, Iraq, 
diaspora), and the religious.17 The term “ethnic” comes from anthropologist Fredrik Barth. 
When one speaks of ethnicity in the media or in much of the social sciences, the attention 
is narrowly focused on the politization of this ground of cultural variation within certain 
modern state structures, i.e. ethnic conflicts, as they tend to arise today.18 Nonetheless, 
“ethnic” in this framework has nothing to do with tribalism and pre-state political systems. 
“On the contrary, it is a response of people to a particular form of state organisation and 
the political opportunities it creates. Further, it is important to recognize that the dynamics 
whereby political mobilization to conflict on an ethnic basis takes place are not the 
expression of collective popular sentiments, but result from tactical moves made by 
political entrepreneurs.”19 This constitutes an important reference for an analysis on how 
and why Shiite “identity” entrepreneurs distribute resources, as they seek not only to 
establish the previously marginalized Shi‘a as part of the Lebanese nation but also to claim 
their central position in it.20 In this sense, “ethnic entrepreneurs” can be applied to a variety 
of economical, political, religious or civilian activists: from NGOs directors or members to 
representatives of Amal and Hezbollah; from diaspora Shiite entrepreneurs who 
established firms in Canada or Sub-Saharan Africa during the Lebanese civil war to high 
ranking religious figures. The reestablishment of transnational networks connecting the 
wealthy Shi‘a diaspora in West Africa with the sending communities in Lebanon further 
changed the expectations of the Shi’a community towards the state. Unlike Al-Sadr, Shiites 
in the 1990s looked towards emigrant relatives and transnational migrant networks to 
address development issues; reconstruct war-torn villages and neighbourhoods; create 
employment opportunities and provide the capital necessary to reinvigorate life in the 
economic cycles of the Shi’a community often through the establishment of numerous, 
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small-scale and diversified family businesses employing immediate relatives and generating 
profits to support immediate family members.21 
 
Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner argue that the development of nationalism is 
intimately bound up with the transition to a new form of economic organisation: the rise of 
capitalism.22 Whereas Anderson and Gellner’s assumption — subscribing to the influential 
account of modernization formulated by Max Weber, according to which the transition to 
modernity is tied to an overall weakening of the relevance of religion in social life — 
necessarily implies a shift towards secularization, other authors, such as Linda Colley23, 
have argued that the rise of modernity did not necessarily remove religious identifications 
and discourse from national public spheres and from popular understandings of 
nationhood.24 In the Lebanese context, this latest assumption rings even more authentic. In 
fact, belonging to a religious community in Lebanon is the only legitimate way of being 
part of the Lebanese nation.25 That doesn’t necessarily mean that identity and nationalism 
should automatically concern the rule of God. Nonetheless, as Roschanack Shaery-
Eisenlohr emphasizes, Shiite modern activism is a way of defining a national public sphere 
that is in accordance with Shiite iconography without necessarily changing the fundamental 
concepts of territorial integrity and popular sovereignty.26 
 
 
From Outcasts to Political Representatives:  
The Rise of a Shiite Conscience in Lebanon 
 
In Lebanon, two explicitly political organizations, Hezbollah and Amal, vie for 
representation and leadership of Lebanese Shiites while other groups — including the 
Mabarrat organization linked to Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the Imam Musa Al-Sadr 
Foundation and, to some degree, the Shi‘a Higher Council — focus on social activities, 
with no apparent political agendas.  
The massive welfare system and philanthropic organisations related to, or owned by 
Hezbollah in Lebanon are often the subject of much speculation. With reference to the 
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tradition of political and social Lebanese Shi‘a - historically deprived of resources, 
mahrumeen (underprivileged) and mustadafeen (weak) - Amal and Hezbollah were able to 
combine their nationalist, religious and political identity to a propensity to understand and 
address the social frustration unprecedented in the history of Lebanon. Thus, Hezbollah 
morphed from a resistance movement into a stateless government that leverages charity to 
meet the needs of the neglected, oppressed and marginalized Lebanese Shi’a population to 
maintain popular support and to continue the resistance discourse. 
 
It is not possible, though, to analyze Hezbollah as a service provider disregarding the Shiite 
political subordination in post-independence Lebanon that had profound economic, social 
and cultural roots, and that was responsible for the urban and political mobilization starting 
from the 1960’s with the arrival of Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon.  
Although the literature about the Shi‘a of Lebanon is relatively large, scholarship about 
Shiites in Lebanon before the second half of the twentieth century is not controversial at 
all; all research focuses more or less on the same subject: the impoverished and 
misrepresented conditions of Shiites since the creation of the Lebanese state. 
 
Since the 9th century a.C., when Shiites established themselves in the south of Lebanon 
(Jabal Ameel) and in the Beqaa Valley27, this population was identified as a poor minority 
whose oppression and tyranny never seemed to end. As early as the 14th century Shi‘as 
were expelled by the Mamluks from their regions and sent to peripheral regions away from 
the Mamluks’ central ruling areas. Even when the Mamluk dynasty fell and the Ottoman 
Empire was established, Lebanese Shiites found themselves in a position of defending 
themselves against the Sunni Ottomans28. Again, during the French mandate and at the 
announcement of Lebanon’s 1943 independence, Lebanese Shi‘a was still very much 
misrepresented and marginalized.29 
 
The literature on the Shi‘a began to change as Shi‘a political mobilization began to move 
his steps. The first stirrings of change came in late 1950s and early 1960s when Shi‘a started 
                                                 
27 Alagha, J. (2006), The shifts in Hizbullah’s ideology: Religion ideology, political ideology, and political program. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, p. 19. 
28 Alagha (2006), pp. 19-20. 
29 A comprehensive work on Shiism and Shiites, with a chapter on Lebanese Shi‘a is Scarcia Amoretti B. (1994), Sciiti nel 
mondo. Roma: Jouvence. 
to be exposed to less peripheral regions of the country, due to internal and external 
migration.30  
The greatest turning point came with the arrival of imam Musa al Sadr, who mobilized the 
Shi‘a, organized them politically, and called for a better political representation and fairer 
distribution of socio-economic conditions. He also worked to form an effective Shi‘a civil 
society independent of the state.  
Rosemary Sayigh’s Too many Enemies31 (1994) analyzes the historical and social background 
of the Lebanese Shi‘a, its awakening with Musa al-Sadr harakat al-mahrumeen and the 
establishment of the Amal movement; Amal’s implications with the Palestinian and Syrian 
presence in Lebanon until the end on the civil war. Sayigh’s encounter is particularly 
effective in describing Lebanese Shiites everyday life’s conditions and their alienation from 
Lebanese politics, their migration to the capital and the consolidation of their identity 
under Musa al Sadr’s guidance. 
 
Al Sadr’s appearance marked the birth of political Shiism in Lebanon.32 Grasping the 
political potential of social assistance as a means of outflanking the traditional elites and 
entering the political arena, al-Sadr underwrote a string of religious and vocational schools 
and a number of orphanages from funds available to him from his contacts with the 
religious authorities in Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran.33 The Imam's role in establishing 
institutions important to his community's political development is well known. Chief 
among them was the Movement of the Dispossessed (harakat al-mahrumeen) founded in 
1974, whose military branch (harakat Amal) was trained in Baalbek to resist Israeli activities 
in the South.34 
 
A further reading that helps to outline Musa al Sadr’s religious and political figure is The 
Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon by Fouad Ajami (1987)35. Ajami analyzes 
the ideological, sociological, and historic context for the advancement of one of the most 
illustrious Iranian-born Lebanese Shiite mullahs in Lebanon, providing clear genealogy of 
the roots of Musa al Sadr and his movement. Ajami provides effective data that helps to 
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understand al-Sadr's role in redefining the politics of the Lebanese Shi‘a and the genesis of 
Amal and Hezbollah. 
 
Before 1932, the Shiite community was institutionally underrepresented. Concentrated in 
the Jabal Amil region, in the south of the country, and in the Beqaa Valley, the Sh‘ia had 
obtained a small portion of political office with the 1943 National Pact (al-Mithaq Al 
Watani). As a result of a census taken in 1932, the 1943 National Pact gave the Maronite 
Christians the permanent presidency of the Republic, and the Sunni Muslim the presidency 
of the Council of Ministers. The Shiites had to be content with the presidency of the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
 
The National Pact consecrated the existence of Lebanon, rejecting those impulses that 
appeared to be contrary to the existence of an independent sovereign country, and marked 
a prominent Maronite and Sunni representation that reflected a new relationship between 
social forces, but it was not consistent either with the great traditions of the mountain 
(Druze pre-eminence with the support of Maronite) nor to those of the French mandate. 
However, the structure created by the National Pact was able to stand intact without major 
breaks until 1975, when the civil war broke out.36 
 
However, al Sadr did not aim to seize power; he strived to increase Shi‘a engagement in the 
state and advance their political rights37. Moreover, even though his efforts were directed 
towards serving the various socio-economic and political interests of the Shi‘a, al Sadr 
called foremost for safeguarding the Lebanese republic. He claimed to support he Palestine 
resistance movement, but his relations with the PLO were tense and uneasy (Norton, 
1987). Al Sadr was a reformer, not a revolutionary and he prophetically warned the PLO 
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that it was not in its interests to establish a state within a state in Lebanon (Norton, 1987); 
most importantly, he called for the support of the Palestinian cause in Palestine, not in 
Lebanon. 
 
Norton (1987)38 outlines the key to the changed political reality of Lebanon as the changed 
position of the Shiite community from the 1960s. The conflicts in large measure stemmed 
from issues of social inequality, injustice and deprivation, plus interregional factors led to 
the revitalization and eventually to the internal split of the movement that brought to the 
formation of Hezbollah in 1985.  
 
Four years after establishing the Amal movement, al Sadr mysteriously disappeared during 
a trip to Libya (1978). In the same year, Israel invaded the south of Lebanon with the code-
named Operation Litani39. A year later the Iranian Revolution erupted, followed by the 
Israeli invasion of 1982, and Amal’s new leader Nabih Berri’s decision to participate in the 
National Salvation Committee (NSC) formed in the wake of the invasion. This resulted in a 
split within Amal and the end of a “natural alliance” (Norton, 1987). The NSC was formed 
alongside with the Maronite leader and Israeli ally Bashir Gemayel. The Islamic faction of 
Amal broke away and founded the party of God, Hezbollah. This brought in the biggest 
transformation in the history of the Shi‘a of Lebanon, and initiated a stage of radical 
institutionalization in contrast with imam al Sadr’s engagement policy with the state, paving 
the road to Shi‘a ascendency and gradually bringing them to the centre of Lebanese 
politics. 
 
The party's emergence is often perceived as the direct result of Iran's regional foreign 
policy needs. Norton (1987) rejects the common notion that it was the Iranian revolution 
that caused this once disorganized community to find itself politically. Norton argues that 
the activism of the Lebanese Shi‘a was the result of a long process of modernization. He 
emphasizes the uprooting of the Shi‘a from their traditional ways and shows how the civil 
war intensified this process, along with the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, the 
disappearance of Musa al Sadr in Libya in 1978 and the Israeli invasion of the south of 
Lebanon in the same year (Operation Litani).  Undoubtedly, the success of the Islamic 
revolution of 1979 in Iran, and the Lebanon war in 1982, further inflamed the Shiite 
revolutionary fervour and widened the gap between the radical groups, but it is vital to 
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consider other transnational aspects to unravel an even more accurate account on the birth 
of the party of God.  
Certainly the most vivid embodiment of Lebanese-Iranian relations — Hezbollah — 
continues to play a major role in the politics of the region. Nonetheless, H. E. Chehabi 
(2006)40 demonstrates that Iran and Lebanon’s “distant relation” has been going on for 
over five hundred years, involving cultural, religious and political levels. Chehabi looks 
beyond the formalities of inter-state foreign policy at the more complicated and influential, 
interactions of non-state actors in the last five hundred years. However, Relations between 
Lebanon and Iran have not always been friendly. Because of Lebanon’s relatively 
democratic politics for instance, Iranian opponents to the Shah used Lebanon as a base 
from which to plot the regime’s downfall.  
After the establishment of the party of God, the Iran-Hezbollah partnership has produced 
large political dividends for the Lebanese party, for it permitted it to become a major 
patron in a country where patron-client relationship constitute the underlying exchange 
pattern (Harik, 2006)41. Funds available to Hezbollah have produced jobs for the educated 
unemployed in party-run or managed bureaux, clinics and hospitals; others seeking work 
find it in the many party-sponsored construction or clean-up units.42 These beneficiaries, in 
the Lebanese tradition, reward their benefactors at the time of elections. 
The increase of Amal and Hezbollah’s social activities — and sometimes, where possible, 
in each other’s domain — shows that success in the Lebanese Shi‘a power struggle depends 
on which competitor can most widely mobilize the Shi‘a population. The fundamental 
issue in today’s economically depressed Lebanon is: what does each movement have to 
offer? (Harik, 2006). What does Hezbollah guarantee that Amal cannot guarantee? 
 
Hezbollah inherited the voice of the Islamist and revolutionary movements of the 1960s, 
and the idea of political mobilization against social inequity that was behind Musa al Sadr’s 
harakat al-mahrumeen. An analysis of the internal socio-economic and political dynamics 
wouldn’t be sufficient though to explain the success of the organization. A number of 
external factors should be taken into account: The party of God represented at the 
beginning of the eighties the one and only successful attempt to export of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution. This radical social and political event, along with the project of a “Greater 
Israel” — as opposed to the Syrian ambitions in Lebanon — and the development of a 
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transnational Shiite movement between Iraq and Iran in the 60s, are unavoidable focal 
points that can help to explain Hezbollah’s political and social path. 
 
The emergence of Hezbollah was thus “based on ideological, social, political, and 
economical mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab, and Islamic context”43. Until 1992 the 
party followed a radical approach having an uncompromising stance towards the Lebanese 
political system. After the end of the civil war, Hezbollah started working incessantly to 
become an integral part of the Lebanese state. When the Ta’if agreement was implemented 
to end the 15-year-old Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah decided to accommodate itself to the 
Lebanese confessional system, entering into alliances beyond sectarian lines.44 It was also 
during this stage that Hezbollah began investing heavily in its social service networks and 
organizations, becoming an efficient service provider for a substantial group of the Shi‘a 
population. But while the party had been calling for state reforms on one hand, on the 
other Hezbollah was undertaking its own reforms to its own population totally 
independent from the state. 
 
Much has been written on Hezbollah's rise and ideology45, though academic literature that 
examines the non-military aspect of Lebanon’s Shi‘a is relatively scarce. This work’s intent 
is to concentrate on the community’s vast economic, social, and educational developments; 
furthermore, it sheds light on the emergence of self-conscious and self-reliant Shiite middle 
class (more secular, compared to Hezbollah’s, and traditionally affiliated with Amal) 
mobilized by the mission of resistance as a “methodology” (Harb and Leenders 2005)46. 
This entails unravelling the social and economic thought of contemporary Lebanese Shi‘a, 
identifying the dissimilarities in the way this new bourgeoisie operates within Amal and 
Hezbollah. 
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Clans, Clerics and Elites 
 
Literature on Shiite clans and elite in Lebanon can be essentially divided into two major 
segments: the pre-civil war, which saw the dominance of the traditional clan leadership 
group (zu‘ama), and the post-war Lebanon dominated by the economical/political elite.  
The political development of Shi‘a has never captured much scholarly attention, although 
in the aftermath of the Khomeinist Revolution (1979) there was a rise in the interest 
towards the Iranian Shi‘a. In the case of Lebanon, in particular, there has been an upsurge 
of academic interest since the 1980s, although it has focused mainly on Hezbollah and, to a 
lesser extent (Augustus R. Norton), Amal.47 
The beginning of a large-scale politicization of Lebanese Shi‘a starts in the 1960s against a 
backdrop of continued dominance by traditional clan leadership group.48 External 
influences were significantly important due mainly to the proximity of Syria. As a result of 
this neighborhood, a few branches of political parties that initially were formed in Syria 
were then established in Lebanon. Traditional political structures were so much part of the 
Lebanese consciousness that indigenous political groupings found it difficult to develop 
independently.49 Amal, for instance, was founded by imam Musa al Sadr, a cleric Iranian by 
birth but of Lebanese heritage. The Islamic Da‘wa party had its origins amongst the 
intellectual elite of the Iraqi clergy. And Hezbollah owes considerable practical and 
ideological allegiance to Iran and to a lesser extent to Iraq. The Lebanese Communist Party 
or the Ba‘ath Party are offshoots of Syrian parent organization. Nonetheless, they have 
served as effective vehicles for advancing the Shi‘a political cause in Lebanon.50 
Before the arrival of Musa al-Sadr, clan-based leadership amongst Lebanese Shi’a was the 
oldest form of community political organization. It emphasized familial loyalty clientelism 
as the primary means of social ordering. 
 
Rodger Shanahan (2005) focuses his study on the political development of the Shi’a from 
the creation of Le Grand Liban in 1920 until the 2000 elections, with a glimpse of Shi’a’s 
activities before 1920. Shanahan extensively describes the role of the zu‘ama as the 
established powerbrokers within Lebanon’s Shi‘a community, as well as the roles of clerics 
and political parties in developing a Shi’a political consciousness.  
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Literature on the historical development of the Lebanese Shi’a is scarce. It mainly focuses 
on Hezbollah (and very little on Amal) rather than on the political activities of Shiites 
outside these groups; thus, there has been modest examination of Hezbollah’s performance 
within the formal Lebanese political system.51  
Studies of Shi’a political development can be divided into three major categories: i) general 
works on Lebanon’s political history with a reference on Lebanese Shi’a; ii) works on Shi’a 
activism (Naim Qassem, 2010)52; iii) works mainly focusing on Hezbollah.  
Primary sources are attainable in Arabic or in English and retrieved from the various 
documents/interviews/dispatches issued by key Shiite figures like Hasan Nasrallah or 
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. A biography of what was referred as “the oracle of 
Hezbollah” that traces the trajectory of the enigmatic, multi-faceted, sometimes 
contradictory personality of Sayyid Fadlallah against a background of cultural, political and 
economic upheaval in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon was published in 2005 by Jamal Sankari.53 
Similarly, speeches from Hasan Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s documents are available in 
Joseph Alagha (ed., 2011) ), Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 
Manifesto54, and Nicholas Noe (ed., 2007) Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah.55  
Shanahan work (2005) provides an update on the state of Shi‘a political development and 
complements Norton (1987) and Ajami (1986) works that were written a few years before 
the end of the civil war. 
 
Rola el-Husseini (2012)56 provides an analysis, based mainly on fieldwork and interviews 
conducted between 2001 and 2006 on the evolution of the Lebanese political scene in the 
years after the Ta’if Agreement. Husseini’s approach is focused on the examination of the 
“political elite”: 
 
[Political elite] includes a range of public and nonpublic figures, from high-ranking government 
officials and military officers, to leaders of professional associations and business and industry 
representatives, to the heads of politically influential families, and to people who are highly placed in 
media organizations, interest groups, and religious communities. These individuals are both 
influential upon and implicated within the political discourse of the nation. 
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 Approaching politics through the lens of the elite is particularly effective in Lebanon 
because of the historical importance of zu‘ama, community leaders who are perceived as 
intercessors for their clients or followers. In this tradition, political agency is understood to 
be primary about cultivating one’s place within a hierarchy of personal relationships, rather 
than advocating for an overreaching ideology or legislative platform.  
 
Describing the pre-war period, Samir Khalaf argued that this historical concept of personal 
leadership, along with an electoral system that allocated political posts according to 
sectarian quotas, resulted in a situation in which individual Lebanese elites were able to 
wield an influence extending far beyond that of their personal electoral bases. By 
establishing alliances with other local landlords, certain leaders were able to build extensive 
patronage networks and to establish long lasting family dynasties.  
Regarding the pre-war period, a scholar work that examines the economic agents, 
institutions, incentives, competences and other forces that forged a Lebanese economic 
model known as the "Merchant Republic" in the aftermath of World War II is Gates’ The 
Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy.57 Gates identifies the broad concept of 
outward-orientation to describe the Lebanese economy. Dominant economic and political 
agents sought to develop the economy on the basis of its intermediary role, regional 
comparative advantage and competitive position in offshore service operations — all of 
which were viewed as essential to the viability of the small Lebanese state. Supporting an 
open and tertiary-oriented economy that serviced rapidly growing Middle East economies, 
these forces shaped Lebanon's economic order until 1958; and in a modified form, they 
influenced its political economy until 1975.  
An overview of pre-war literature is functional in contextualizing properly the shift that 
saw the Shi‘a community evolving from dispossessed community to entrepreneurial social 
actor. Plua, it could help to answer some questions regarding the businesses of the Shi‘a 
after the civil war, where this entrepreneurial social class comes from (genealogy, social 
history), and how different the middle class Shi‘a is from other communities today. Are 
there any economic powerful Shiite families today in Lebanon and abroad? How do they 
make their money? How much in the game are they? How much integrated are they?  
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The greatest amount of literature that analyzes the phenomenon of zu‘ama, notables and 
landlords pre-civil war maintains that this clientelistic system declined at the beginning of 
the war, but it’s more than evident that it reappeared in a different version very quickly 
after the end of the conflicts (during the clashes warlords prevailed). Political parties per se 
are rather weak and too much entrapped in the logics of favouritism and nepotism (with 
the only exception of Hezbollah), so even today aspiring elites still emerge on the political 
and economical scene almost exclusively through a patronage relationship with an 
important political leader, generally the leader of a sectarian community to whom the 
emerging elite belongs.58 Lebanon's powerful families have somehow survived a civil war, 
foreign interventions, and the ballot box. It's a great irony: In the one Arab country where 
citizens could legally and peacefully rid themselves of second and third-generation leaders 
who rose on little but their last name, they choose not to do so. There are a lot of reasons 
for that, related to Lebanon's peculiar political system and its precarious domestic peace – 
but one key reason is the families themselves have proven incredibly politically flexible. 
 
Sectarianism is far from being in decline. Karim Knio speaks of neo-sectarianism where “it 
is clear that ‘old/new’ cleavages that characterize Lebanese politics is omnipresent”. He 
points out that “behind the simplistic and short-term distinction between an anti- and a 
pro-Syrian camp lies a clash of a multitude of different Lebanese national projects tailored 
around the interest of every sect respectively”.59 Fawaz Gerges, however, disagrees with the 
one-layered depiction of Lebanese politics.60 He notes that “far from being sectarian-based 
or driven, the power struggle in Lebanon is multi-layered and complex. Sectarianism is 
used and abused to mask vested interests and differences”.61 Sectarianism is undoubtedly 
part of Lebanese politics; as part of identity politics, since 2005, it has been fused with new 
political labels. Traditional politics in Lebanon have always been focused on sectarian 
identities, and sectarianism had long been institutionalised – under the Ottoman Empire, 
the French Mandate and since independence. In Lebanon, authority is not centralized.62 
Authority is distributed amongst precincts defined by sectarian lines.  
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Political Society or Civil Society? 
From Political Islam to Electoral Islam 
 
It’s been over a decade since political Islam in itself is no longer the major issue in Middle 
East politics. Welfare, democratization and a vivid debate on civil society are. Islamists’ 
credibility as political actors hinge upon the concrete alternatives they present to 
authoritarian, corrupt or sometimes absent governments with their skewed distribution of 
wealth and resources. In this regard, each country in the region presents a unique 
configuration of Islamic forces and opinions 
While civil society has a plethora of definitions, the London School of Economics Centre 
for Civil Society offers a useful working definition: 
 
Civil society refers to the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and 
values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, and family though in 
practice the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and 
negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, 
varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by 
organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community 
groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-
help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group.63 
 
In addition to the LSE definition of civil society, it is appropriate in our context to define 
the concept of ‘political society’ as conceptualized by Partha Chatterjee. According to 
Chatterjee, political society is a domain of institutions and activities where several 
mediations are carried out64. Thus,  
 
The politics of democratization must therefore be carried out not in the classical transactions between 
state and civil society but in the much less well defined, legally ambiguous, contextually and 
strategically demarcated terrain of political society.65 
 
The idea of political society is potentially radical in identifying that the populations which 
make up this alternative site, are neither agents of the state nor civil society. They are often 
excluded in the process of political participation: For the sake of survival and livelihood, 
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they have to negotiate with both state and civil society or public sphere, domains often led 
and occupied by the middle-class bourgeois subjects and social élites.66 
 
Chatterjee’s definition of political society appears to be more persuasive and more 
consonant within the Middle Eastern context while ‘civil society’ of citizens represents 
more of a Western model of politics. Furthermore, in most Middle Eastern countries the 
communal and corporate groups within the population relate to political parties via 
continuous bargaining and deals and exchanging electoral support for welfare provisions 
directly delivered to that specific group. This is certainly the case in Lebanon, where state 
personnel or the ruling party strikes mutually beneficial deals with patrons, notables and 
chiefs representing particular interests. 
 
A renowned civil society theoretician, John Keane, disagrees with the exclusion of the 
realm of the economy from that of civil society. He argues that satisfaction with the 
material conditions of life cannot be separated from the realm of civil society.67 This is 
particularly true if we take into consideration the extremely poor economic conditions of 
the Lebanese Shi’a in the 60’s and how the greatest majority of Shiites in those years were 
politically and economically unrepresented. Shiite’s population growth and urban migration 
began in Lebanon during the 60’s and culminated during the civil war in the mid-70s. This 
population boom placed a heavy pressure on urban (and suburban) social services. 
 
The usage of ‘political’ Islamic society is most appropriate as it defines programs for social, 
economic and government reform, as well as attempts to form and mobilize constituencies 
on that basis. This political society references Islam for general ethical and legal guidance, 
rather than aiming for an Islamic state or deriving strict rules from sacred sources. 
Additionally, it combines a whole range of strategic actions adopted by subalterns as part 
of this much less well-defined domain of political activity. It is less ideological in 
differentiating between political movements organized around alternative (to both state and 
civil society) democratic and radical principles, and the strategic and contextually defined 
‘politics of the possible.’ In fact, it combines them together to include a seamless domain 
of negotiation and survival.  
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Post-1992 Hezbollah has been extremely effective in trying to ‘capture the state’. The vast 
majority of Islamist movements involve preaching and other da‘wa (missionary) activities, 
alms giving, providing medical care, mosque building, publishing and generally promoting 
what is considered in the society to be public virtue through community action. 
Nonetheless, these activities engage the domain we call the political both in the sense that 
they are subject to restrictions imposed by the state (such as licensing), and in so much as 
they must often compete with state or state-supported institutions (pedagogic, 
confessional, medical) promoting ‘Western’ models of family, worship, leisure and social 
responsibility. The success of even a conservative project to preserve a traditional form of 
personal piety will depend on its ability to engage with the legal, bureaucratic, disciplinary 
and technological resources of modern power that shape contemporary societies.68 
 
Vali Nasr’s works bring a clarifying focus on political Islam in Lebanon’s Shiite circles as 
his most influential work has been on the importance of sectarian identity in Middle East 
politics and the growing importance and renaissance of Shi‘a politics and the intersections 
between Lebanon, Iran and Iraq Shiite movements.69 His book The Rise of Islamic 
Capitalism focuses on the importance of a new middle class to future of the Muslim world, 
which presaged the role of the middle class in democratic uprisings of 2011.70  
 
To contextualize the shift from political Islam to Electoral Islam: Oliver Roy at the 
beginning of the 90s had already predicted the failure of political Islam71; Gilles Kepel 
(2000) reached the same conclusion in his book Jihad, the rise and fall of Islamism.72 Mohamed 
Chérif Ferjani73 closely examined the steps that in these last couple of decades brought 
Islamist’s parties to electoral success: 
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 As it happens, many radical Islamic movements and parties no longer reject in the same way the 
way the democracy they considered for a long time to be a Western system at odds with the teachings 
of Islam. They no longer snub the elections to which they once preferred recourse to weapons and 
uprisings; uprisings that were planned deep within the community through mosques and charitable 
and cultural organizations to increase membership among those excluded from globalization and the 
chaotic modernization which has shattered Muslim societies. 
Everywhere that they have been able to take part in local or national elections, radical Islamic 
movements and parties have presented candidates and led electoral campaigns which have revealed 
their capacity to mobilize supporters and their advance on the traditional parties and new democratic 
oppositions.74 
 
The elections in Palestine and Lebanon provide quite recent illustrations of this tendency. 
In Palestine, after the failure of the call to boycott the presidential elections, which resulted 
in the election of Mahmoud Abbas in January 2005 with a participation level of 70%, 
Hamas, contrary to Islamic Jihad, took part in the municipal elections, in which they won 
the largest towns. Then, to the general surprise of everyone, including their own leaders, 
they achieved an absolute majority in the general election of January 2006, with 76 seats 
against 40 seats to their main rival, Fatah.75 
In Lebanon, those elected under the banner of Hezbollah numbered only 12 out of 128 
because of the electoral system born out of the confessional pact of 1943, with some 
modifications put in place by the Tâ’if agreement. However, the role played by this party in 
the liberation of the South against the Israeli occupation and the demonstrations that it 
succeeded in organising in 2005 to support Syria, as well as the negotiations carried out by 
other different parties, such as Christians or Muslims, with their leaders show the 
importance of this movement in the Lebanese political environment.76 
 
Referring to the framework of this study, the analysis carried out by Ferjani raises some 
interesting research questions: i) To what extent are (or are not) the electoral victories of 
Islamic movements a confirmation of the incompatibility between Islam, on one side, and 
democracy and secularisation on the other?; ii) Does the participation of Islamist groups in 
elections result from a democratic conversion or from a sort of duplicity/adaptability of 
these movements?; iii) Are the conditions which gave rise to charities and welfare provision 
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systems in the Western world in anyway comparable to those delivered by Islamic 
providers?; iv) Could Islamic charitable and developmental institutions bring to a shift 
towards a ‘secular’ welfare distribution even in a fragmented society like Lebanon?77 
 
One of the most extensive works on the shifts in Hezbollah’s ideology was carried out by 
Joseph Alagha (2006).78 Since the early 1990s Hezbollah evolved into a mainstream political 
party, with a massive network of social services that benefits not only Shiite Muslim but 
also Sunnis and Christians. Alagha shows how Hezbollah started off as a religious 
movement under the constituency of the vilayat-e-faqih and became a political party with a 
specific governmental responsibility by joining the cabinet in 2005.  
 
Hizbullah’s political program is based upon the following constituents: oppressors and oppressed; 
perspectives on the Islamic state; dialogue with the Lebanese Christians; jurisprudential stipulations 
of parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work; socio-economic program: Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and civil institutions; Lebanonisation and infitah (“opening up”); relations 
with Syria and Iran; perspective on Israel; and jihad and martyrdom. 
 
Alagha brings up those questions in order to investigate on the process in which Hezbollah 
shifted from total ideology to integration policy in the Lebanese public sphere 
(Lebanonisation or infitah). At the same time, Alagha reveals some extremely valuable 
questions for a study on Hezbollah’s social activities: In what way did Hezbollah want to 
appeal to strata and sectors of the population, mainly Christians and Sunnis, it did not 
reach out to before? What are the political implications of including them in Hezbollah’s 
election lists? Is it simply Realpolitik or pragmatism? Are there usual stable alliances and 
cooperation with other political parties? How does this resonate inside the party? Is 
Hezbollah mobilizing all its resources and capabilities to integrate in the Lebanese public 
sphere?79 
 
Lebanon is an emblematic case for studying how politico-religious social welfare provision 
affects national integration in divided societies. In such contexts, mobilization of 
supporters outside of electoral competition may be an important means of demonstrating 
political influence and pressing political demands. When multiple parties and organizations 
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compete for supporters in a given community, political groups have even more incentive to 
cater to the welfare needs of potential core supporters.80 
 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 
in the Arab and Lebanese Context 
 
Throughout the Middle East and much of the developing world, public social welfare 
infrastructures have either declined or were never developed in the first place. At the same 
time, social service provision by non-state actors, particularly by religious organizations, is 
on the rise. 
 
Civil society in the Arab World has been shaped and constrained by a history of foreign 
intervention and stringent controls imposed by authoritarian and paternalistic regimes. The 
development of civil society has been uneven, with a much greater concentration of actors 
in some countries. An increasing number of CSOs are providing services across the 
region.81 Very frequently, when those CSOs try to advocate for rights on behalf of 
vulnerable groups, they fall foul of laws curbing association and expression – many of 
which remain virtually unchanged from the colonial era. The ‘war on terror’ has further 
affected the growth of civil society, as the USA demands stricter supervision of CSOs’ 
financial flows.82 
 
The concept of "civil society" is a little controversial, especially when analyzed in relation 
to the Islamic world. 
Richard Norton, one of the most influential analysts of civil society in the Middle East, 
defines civil society in these terms:  
 
a place where a mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndacates, federations, unions, parties and 
groups come together to provide a buffer between the state and citizens.83  
 
The author emphasizes, therefore, that the term civil society refers to a collective, 
organized, voluntary participation, which unfolds within the context of the public space 
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between the individual and the state; in this frame, it embraces a plurality of actors, 
including the same non-governmental organizations. 
 
Rishmawi and Morris have identified the main common characteristics of CSOs across the 
Arab region (amongst which a shared history of external domination; rapid population 
growth in recent decades and young populations, with consequent youth unemployment), 
and the main key differences (In countries like Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, earlier 
access to education and development of newspapers created an intelligentsia which helped 
spur development of civil society. By comparison, Gulf States remained closer to tribal 
values; The uneven distribution of wealth; The uneven distribution of CSOs).84 
 
Sarah Ben Néfissa (2005)85, Jon B. Alterman (2007)86, Julia Pitner (2000)87 and Sheila 
Carapico (2000)88 debate on the origin, nature and efficiency of NGOs in the Middle East. 
In particular, Carapico and Pitner with their prospect show evidence of the main 
weaknesses of NGOs in the Middle East: the absence of grassroots activity, inefficiency, 
lack of self-reference in the sector and independent of governments and/or international 
donors. 
 
Inevitably, the debate focuses on the possibility of considering Islamist groups as part of 
civil society. In this regard, many critics believe that this is not possible, considering the use 
of violence by some Islamists groups; other analysts tend to emphasize how these groups 
are efficient in responding to the socio-economic needs of citizens, becoming therefore an 
integral part of civil society. This discussion can be easily applied to the so-called 
"community-based organizations", i.e. those based on family ties and clan. 
The discussion on civil society focuses essentially on a primary question: is there any 
compatibility between Islam and civil society and, consequently, between Islam and 
democracy? 
 
Yahya Sadowski, analyzes two different approaches — the Orientalist and the 
Developmental perspectives — and considers both of them spoiled by the same basic 
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inaccuracies: in an essentialist and a-historical perspective, they consider Islam as an entity 
always equal to itself and immune to change, and ignore the impact of imperialism on 
Middle Eastern societies, as well as the fact that the relationship between state and society 
changes according to the historical and socio-political context.89 
 
The Orientalist perspective sees NGOs as a simple extension of the Middle East 
patrimonialism and patriarchy characteristic of Islam. This vision contrasts with the idea 
that to NGOs must be recognized independence and historical specificity.  
The developmental approach is described by Sheila Carapico. Carapico claims that it is 
possible to promote democratization and development by encouraging self-organization at 
the grassroots level and promoting the activities of NGOs at local, national and 
international level, considering them as agents of liberalization. This idea of development 
through the non-governmental sector responds to a neoliberal perspective essentially 
addressed to the resolution of socio-economic problems through the privatization of 
services.90 
 
Lebanese civil society has grown in a unique environment characterised by constant 
political instability, a weak, unresponsive and often authoritarian state, inconsistent rule of 
law, chronic economic problems, a sectarian social structure and external interference in 
Lebanese affairs. Civil society’s impact on politics is relatively limited, but its role in 
providing services is significant. Many Lebanese CSOs are not noted for transparency, 
especially those which are family-based or dominated by a powerful individual. There is a 
rift between the active role civil society plays in promoting democratic values and a poor 
record of practicing them (Rishmawi & Morris)91. 
 
There was a sharp increase in the number of CSOs after the end of the 1975-1990 civil war 
that paralyzed the Lebanese state. The re-emergence/foundation of non-sectarian 
associations adopting non-confessional and non-political agendas was highly significant in 
restoring national confidence and promoting active citizenship. 
The ongoing consequences of the devastating conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the 
summer of 2006 – has not only destroyed hope, but also forced civil society to focus on 
relief and assistance to victims of the war. Many Lebanese CSOs were affected by the 
conflict, losing offices, assets and records. The uncoordinated response to the emergency 
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was complicated by the fact that the major Lebanese protagonist – Hezbollah – also 
prominently provides welfare and relief services. In Lebanon, as in Gaza, the UN and 
international NGOs have sought to almost completely sideline a dominant civil society 
actor (Rishmawi & Morris). 
 
A consequence of NGOs taking on government role — and this is the case of Hezbollah92 
— can lead to what Wood calls a “franchise state”93 in which each franchise can be 
understood as its own public service sector dominated by an NGO network, with NGOs 
carrying out projects with concur with their donors’ or directors’ ideological preferences. In 
this case NGOs are social organizations that may compete with the state for the loyalty of 
their citizens. Individual strategy vis-à-vis these organizations are influenced by material 
incentives, coercion, and the manipulation of symbols (Migdal, 1988)94. Considering that 
NGOs can gain social control and power via their service delivery, most notably in the 
context of a negligent or insolvent state, donors’ or leaders’ ideological preferences can be 
reproduced with NGO service recipients.95 
 
Francesco Cavatorta and Vincent Durac outline an exhaustive historical review on civil 
society in the Arab states and in Lebanon and civil society activism, particularly focusing on 
the major trends that characterize human rights groups and associations. Cavatorta and 
Durac study deals with the problematic task of defining the concept of civil society and its 
relationships with democracy. In particular, their focus is on the  
 
Western understanding of civil society, its perceived positive role in process of democratization and its 
current policy making relevance in terms of democracy-promotion strategies that Western countries 
and international organizations pursue.96 
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Cavatorta and Durac work is particularly relevant when it comes analyzing the Lebanon 
case as it sets out how the nature of the political system impacts differently on civil society 
dynamics in semi-authoritarian or problematic contexts as opposed to established 
democracies. The assumptions is that some civil society actors adapt to their setting in 
order to perform their functions and fulfil their mandate, while others oppose authoritarian 
regimes without, however, being able to perform their functions.97 
 
Understanding the relationship between the state and civil society organizations, including 
politico-religious social welfare providers, naturally requires an understanding of who or 
what the state is in Lebanon. There is no single state in Lebanon. Rather, each confessional 
group is a mini-state within a state or at least controls part of the state apparatus98. 
Lebanon’s power-sharing system is founded on pacts among elites, who forge pre- and 
post-electoral compromises, thereby ensuring the stability of the overall system, with little 
opportunity for meaningful input on the part of the citizenry.99 Even Lebanon’s particular 
mix of electoral regimes, which combines a division of power along religious/sectarian 
lines with majoritarian electoral rules, does not achieve its intended goal of fostering cross-
sectarian cooperation in society because elite-level alliances among political leaders from 
different sects undercut the need to forge meaningful linkages with citizens from other 
sects in many districts.100 
In exchange for services, politico-religious providers expect political support from 
beneficiaries through voting, volunteering in political parties or organizations, or generating 
community support for political organizations and parties affiliated with service 
providers.101 Specifically, the most articulated and in-depth study (with a strong theoretical 
framework) on social welfare and religion in the Middle East and Lebanon in particular is 
represented by Rana Jawad’s (2009)102 work which presents a new anschaung on the complex 
social and political dynamics shaping social welfare in the Middle East. Based on an in-
depth study of the major Muslim and Christian religious welfare organisations in Lebanon 
(including Hezbollah), and drawing upon supplementary research conducted in other 
MENA countries, Jawad’s persuasive argument is that religion is providing sophisticated 
solutions to the major social and economic problems of the Middle East 
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Amal, Hezbollah and Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Capitals 
 
Even a brief analysis of Amal and Hezbollah’s social institutions may show how the 
organization succeeded as a social welfare provider in changing the status of the 
underdeveloped, marginalized, and uneducated Shi‘a through its vast network of various 
social, health, and educational institutions; plus, as service provider it gained substantial 
popularity among the Lebanese Shiite population (but not exclusively Shiite), in exchange 
of political support. But most importantly, it delved into the constituents of Hezbollah’s 
strength at the socio-economic and educational levels that helped enhance the status of the 
Shi‘a in Lebanon, elevating their social standing, and contributing to the establishment of a 
“resistance middle class society”.103 “Resistance” as a mission and a choice of life. And as 
such, “resistance” is understood beyond combat and includes social and political jihad as 
well.104 
 
Studying the socio-economic aspect of Amal and Hezbollah is uncommon since 
researchers have mostly showed interest in the party’s military and political activity. This 
work tries to study both aspects together, showing the points of divergence and friction 
between the two and analyzing the motives and rationales behind this divergence. 
Although Hezbollah’s practices of establishing massive private social networks went 
against with the political thought that brought the party into existence, the party saw the 
Shi‘a emancipation through these institutions. Consequently, these non-political networks 
of Hezbollah shall be considered an extension of the political ones in instituting a 
resistance culture and identity, and in understanding the rising of Shi‘a socio-political 
status. 
 
Capital, which, in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a 
potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form, contains a 
tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not 
equally possible or impossible. And the structure of the distribution of the different types and 
subtypes of capital at a given moment in time represents the immanent structure of the social world, 
                                                 
103 Abdel-Samad, M. & Flanigan, S. T. (2011). “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations.” Middle 
East Policy Council. 
Retrieved from http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-eastpolicy-archives/hezbollahs-social-jihad-nonprofits-resistance-
organizations 
Harb, M. & Leenders, R. (2005), pp. 173-197. 
104 Ibidem.. 
i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a 
durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.105 
 
Vali Nars in The Rise of Islamic Capitalism106 introduces a critical theory that goes beyond the 
idea proposed by the majority of the literature that sees Hezbollah as the only service 
provider for (mainly) Shiites in Lebanon. Starting from Bourdieu’s theory of economic 
capital, and developing Nasr’s argument — that suggests that the south of Lebanon (a 
Hezbollah/Amal stronghold) is emerging economically, not just because of Hezbollah’s 
redistribution of resources, but thanks to a consolidating businessmen and a provincial 
middle class — the focus will shift to one of the backbones of the work, i.e. an in-depth 
analysis of the Shi‘a middle class. Amal has always been considered the party of a more 
secular (compared to Hezbollah) Shiite bourgeoisie, but the literature entirely lacks of a 
study on Lebanon’s contemporary middle class. South Lebanon, the southern suburbs of 
Beirut and the Beqaa may seem unlikely places for business to thrive. Yet this is exactly 
what has been happening in the past two decades. There is something about this Shi‘a 
enclave and it does not have to do with war but with its uncanny ability to churn out 
entrepreneurs who generate wealth and sustain the rising local middle class.107  
 
Joseph Alagha in Hizbullah’s Identity Construction (2011) analyzes the party of God’s resource 
mobilization as a bridge between identity and Pierre Bourdieu’s capitals. In particular, 
Alagha applies Ousmane Kane’s interpretation of Bourdieu’s notion of different typologies 
of capitals (Kane readjusted and applied Bourdieu’s religious, political, symbolic, social, and 
economic capitals to the study of Islamic movements).108  
 
Alagha examines Hezbollah’s use of resource mobilization focusing on how Hezbollah 
employs different kinds of capitals in this process and the shifting balances among them.109 
A specific attention will be addressed to Hezbollah’s use of social and political capital, and 
how the shift from the social to the political sphere was produced.  Bourdieu analyzes the 
logic “whereby this particular kind of capital is accumulated, transmitted, and reproduced, 
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the means of understanding how it turns into economic capital and, conversely, what work 
is required to convert economic capital into social capital”.110  
 
Bourdieu’s capitals are considered forms of resource mobilization. According to Kane, 
accumulation of capital is “a process through which social actors go in order to obtain a 
given sort of capital”111, and by conversion, spending the accumulated capital to get 
something in return (mobilization of civil society; political/identity power and stability). 
By analyzing the changing shifting balances of Hezbollah’s use of mobilization of 
resources, and through the agencies of interviews and on-the-field-work — some research 
questions and statements on how and why charity becomes politics (and how and why 
politics relies on mobilization of resources) will be highlighted. Specifically, Pierre 
Bourdieu’s classification and Kane/Alagha adaptation of Bourdieu’s capital theory will be 
applied to understand if and how resources are implemented in moments of political 
instability, and how Hezbollah’s welfare institutions react under specific circumstances of 
political/institutional turmoil. 
 
Likewise, Bourdieu’s theories and their further reinterpretations constitute an important 
framework in considering Hezbollah’s shift par excellence. Starting in 1992, the party of God 
decided to move partially away from the rigid military action and radicalization agenda that 
had characterized the structure of the party from the beginning, and start a new chapter 
denoted by political accommodation. It was during this phase that the party claimed to be 
part of the Lebanese state. It was also during this stage that Hezbollah invested heavily in 
its social service networks and organizations, becoming an efficient service provider for a 
substantial group of the Shi‘a population. But while the party was exercising political 
propaganda by calling for a strong state capable of undertaking reforms on the political, 
administrative, economic, social, and educational levels that could help all the Lebanese 
population112 (Bourdieu’s accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state) — at the 
same time Hezbollah knew that allowing an advancement of the state in that direction 
would seriously threaten the party’s own existence. 
Consequently, how did Amal and Hezbollah mobilize their resources during this important 
stage? And what kind of “capitals” did Amal and Hezbollah implemented in order to have 
an integrative role within the Lebanese polity and participate in the state’s decision-making 
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process and at the same time boosting and maintaining their popularity within the Shi‘a 
community in Lebanon? 
 
To what extent the Shiite middle class is affiliated with either Amal or Hezbollah? And why 
is it likely to support economically Amal instead of Hezbollah or viceversa? What is their 
geographical distribution? Is the distribution of resources just a key to domination?  
Adham Saouli divides the support base of Hezbollah into the: (1) ideologically oriented, (2) 
business oriented and (3) sympathizers (2003)113. The first group includes the top party 
members and their families, who support the party regardless what orientation it will take. 
Those belonging to the second group have commercial interests or profitable gains in the 
areas that are under Hezbollah’s control. They are affiliated with the party because their 
interests are safeguarded. However, the third group is the largest group, characterized by 
those who mainly benefit from the services of Hezbollah. People belonging to this group 
feel protected by the party and admire its achievements. 
Admittedly that a substantial amount of cash, funds and material goods of Hezbollah’s 
remittances comes from Iran (and also from Syria in the case of Amal), what is the 
motivation behind middle class “ethnic” entrepreneurs that finance their co-sectarians in 
Shi‘a dominated areas of Lebanon? 
MP Mohammad Ra‘ad, head of Hezbollah’s “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc in the 
Lebanese parliament, claims that the main income of Hezbollah is generated through 
private investment and wealthy Shi‘as, especially coming from those living in South 
America and Africa114. How are these “fundraising” and donations activities organized? 
What is the motivation behind this mobilization and financial support? What kind of 
activities is the Shiite bourgeoisie abroad involved in? And finally, to what extend is it 
possible to conceive the possibility of a financial support in a society so profoundly divided 
along sectarian lines without strong political commitments and affiliations? 
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